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I.

INTRODUCTION

Problems of pluri-dimensional complexity of definition, classification and norm-formulation converge in any meaningful endeavor to explore practical measures to prevent, preempt or otherwise to discourage and suppress acts of terrorism on an
international scene. The present study is devoted to the treatment
of only one of these problems, namely, the problem of jurisdiction.
This problem presents itself in more than one connection. To ensure proper appreciation of the nature and scope of the multi-faceted problem of jurisdiction in the context of international terrorism, preliminary attention is focused on the need to adopt a
balanced approach to the basic notion of international terrorism.
In the pages that follow, the study will consist of five substantive parts. In addition to Part I, Part II will deal with the problem
of defining "international terrorism," examining the definition previously adopted in the Geneva Convention of 1937 and its current
adaptations analyzing various elements of acts of terrorism, and
illustrating the different types of offenses associated with "international terrorism."
Part III will examine the conceptual problem relating to the
different types as well as the nature and scope of national jurisdiction of a sovereign State, the exercise of such jurisdiction, the
causes of jurisdictional problems and some plausible solutions.
Part IV will consider the permissible legal bases of jurisdiction, through the Territorial Principle, subjective and objective, including its extended notion and intended effect, the Nationality or
Personality Principle, active and passive, the Protective Principle
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and its role as an alternative to the passive nationality principle,
the Universal Principle in its glowing splendor and the Principle of
Consent expressed in the form of an international agreement.
These principles are presented with all necessary ramifications.
Part V will suggest a possible posture in response to international terrorism, partly through ratification of the anti-terrorism
related conventions, partly by introduction of improved procedures
for extradition of alleged offenders of terrorist acts, and without
impairing the right to seek political asylum, especially excluding
"terrorism" from the exception of political offense in extradition
treaties and statutes, taking into account the available option to
surrender or to prosecute the alleged offender.
Part VI will leave readers with an irresistible conclusion in
support of an international obligation for all States to cooperate
and to adopt all measures necessary to contain and combat acts of
international terrorism, to preempt or prevent terrorist acts, and to
punish the offenders for their international crimes regardless of
race, sex or religion, and indeed their official status or governmental connections notwithstanding.
II. DEFINING "TERRORISM"
A.

AN ACCEPTED DEFINITION OF "INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM"

Definitional problems of primary importance loom large in any
attempt to encapsulate the general notion of "terrorism" or to
identify the salient features of "acts of terrorism." A marked increase in the intensity, frequency and variety of occurrences of
"acts of terrorism" in the diverse parts of the globe has prompted
more recent authors to suggest a definitional approach 1 with varying components1 without sufficiently reflecting the existing notion
of terrorism as earlier defined in a general multilateral convention.
For a purpose, not unlike that of the present study, the Con1. See, e.g., Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and
Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law under the FSIA and the Act of
State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191-251 (1983).
2. Paust, supra note l, at 192-93. "Terrorism itself can be defined as a process that
involves the international use of violence, or threat of violence, against an instrumental target in order to communicate to a primary target a threat of future violence so as both to
coerce the primary target into behavior or attitudes through intense fear or anxiety and to
serve a particular political end.'; Id. Compare Mickolus, Statistical Approaches to the
Study of Terrorism, in TERRORISM: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 209-10 (Y. Alexander &
S. Finger eds. 1977); Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217, 219 n.1 (1977).
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vention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, adopted
by the Internatational Conference On the Repression of Terrorism
on November 16, 1937 (1937 Convention),8 contains a pertinent
definition of "acts of terrorism" as well as provisions elaborating
and enumerating criminal offenses under this heading.
Article 1, paragraph 2, of the 1937 Convention provides:
In the present convention, the expression "acts of terrorism"
means criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons,
or group of persons or the general public.•

Before proceeding to define the notion of terrorism, Paragraph
1 of the 1937 Convention reaffirms "the principle of international
law in virtue of which it is the duty of every State to refrain from
any act designed to encourage terrorist activities directed against
another State and to prevent the acts in which such activities take
shape."& It also stipulates the obligation of States to "undertake as
hereinafter provided to prevent and punish activities of this nature
and to collaborate for this purpose. " 6 This undertaking implies the
duty on the part of each of the States that are parties to adopt
legislation establishing jurisdiction not only to arrest; try and punish, but above all to prescribe as a punishable offense acts of terrorism so defined' and to extend criminal jurisdiction of its courts
to prosecute and enforce judgements.
Article 2 requires each of the States' parties to make the following acts of terrorism punishable criminal offenses if committed
on its territory and directed against another State party:
3. An alarming number of political assassinations have taken place in Europe in rapid
succession since 1934. Notable among the internationally protected persons who fell victim
to terrorist acts may b~ mentioned: Monsieur Louis Barthou, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and King Alexander of Yugoslavia, who was assailed in Marseilles while visiting
France.
The two notorious incidents prompted France and its European allies to convene an
international conference in Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations, which
adopted the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, on Nov. 16, 1937.
See Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Compendium of
Relevent International Instruments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/368, at 18-22 (Apr. 13, 1983) [hereinafter Draft Code]; see also International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism,
Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, Nov. 16, 1937, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/368, at 23-26 (1983) [hereinafter Geneva Convention of 1937]. Neither of the two
Conventions entered into force as World . War II interrupted the process of ratification by
States.
4. Draft Code, supra note 3, at 18.
5. Id. art. 1, para. 1, at 18.
6. Id.
7. Id. arts. 2-4, at 18-19.
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(1) Any wilful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of
liberty to:
(a) Heads of States, persons exercising the perogatives of the
head of the State, their hereditary or designated successors;
(b) The wives or husbands of the above-mentioned persons;
(c) Persons charged with public functions or holding public
positions when the act is directed against them in their public
capacity.
(2) Wilful destruction of, or damage to, public property or property
devoted to a public purpose belonging to or subject to the authority of another High Contracting Party.
(3) Any wilful act calculated to endanger the lives of members of
the public.
(4) Any attempt to commit an offence falling within the foregoing
provisions of the present article.
(5) The manufacture, obtaining, possession, or supplying of arms,
ammunition, . explosives, or harmful substances ,with a view to the
commission in any country whatsoever of an offence falling within
the present article. 8

The definition adopted by the 1937 Convention and the list of
punishable offenses of acts of terrorism were incorporated in the
third report of Minister Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, for
the International Law Commission in Draft Code of Offences
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in 1985.9 Draft Article
11 of the fourth report by the same author, enumerates acts constituting crimes against peace, among which paragraph 4 includes:
the undertaking, assisting or encouragement by the authorities of a
State of terrorist acts in another State, or the toleration by these
authorities of activities organized for the purpose of carrying out
terrorist acts in another State. 10 Subparagraph (a) contains a definition of terrorist acts 11 taken almost verbatim from the 1937 Convention12 and sub-paragraph (b) in effect enumerates offenses constituting terrorist acts in the same fashion as Article 2 of the
8. Iq. at 18.
9. See Thiam, Third Report on the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/387, art. 4, para. (D), reprinted in [1985) 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. CoMM'N 82-83, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1985/Add.(Part 1).
10. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 38th Session,
U.N. Doc. A/41/10, reprinted in [1986) Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N ch. 5, art. 11, para. 4, at 43
n.105 [hereinafter International Law Commission Report].
11. Id. Compare Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov.
16, 1937, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/368, at 23-26 (1983).
12. See id.
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earlier Convention. 13
B.

ELEMENTS OF "ACTS OF TERRORISM"

The elements of "acts of terrorism" as contained in the 1937
Convention and the Draft Articles by Minister Doudou Thiam are
broadly similar. The acts in question, the actus reus, must be punishable offenses, directed against a State, and intended or calculated, mens rea, to create a state of fear or "terror" in the minds of
public figures, or a group of persons or the general public. First, to
constitute a crime against peace, as a category of offenses against
the peace and security of mankind, the "terrorist acts" or "acts of
terrorism" must be by the authorities of a State consisting either
in the "undertaking," "assisting" or "encouragement" and it has to
be committed in another State.
Alternatively, the definition also covers "toleration" by State
authorities "of activities organized for the purpose of carrying out
terrorist acts in another State. m• To amount to a crime against
peace, the terrorist acts must have been attributable to a State either through State authorities, in the form of active undertaking,
assistance or encouragement, or indeed passive toleration without
actual participation. In any event, the definition presupposes the
existence of an obligation on the part of a State not knowingly to
allow its territory to be used in the organizing or staging of activities for the commission of terrorist acts in another State.
Secondly, the act must be directed against "another State."
To this requirement is added "or the population of a State,"
thereby extending the scope of terrorism to cover also the population of another State. 16 Finally, the element of intent or purpose or
mens rea is clearly referable to the intentional inducement of
"fear" or "terror," a psychological effect to be produced by the actus reus or the act of terror in question.
Thus, an act of terrorism which is directed against a State or
its population and calculated to create a state of fear in the minds
of individuals, a group of persons or the public at large _does not
constitute an offense against peace (or against the peace and secur13. International Law Commission Report, supra note 10, at 43 n.105. Compare Geneva Convention of 1937, supra note 3, at 4.
14. See International Law Commission Report, supra note 10, para.4, at 43 n.105.
15. Id. Note especially "Definition of Terrorist Acts." In fact, this extension is implicit
in the creation of a state of "terror" or "fear" in the minds of public figures (chez des
personalites), or a group of persons or the general public. The last "phrase" is invariably
referable to the population of that other State.
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ity of mankind) under the Draft Code, unless the act in question
was committed by another State or was otherwise imputed or attributable to the State through its officials' action or omission or
toleration.
Even without this additional element linking the act of terrorism to the State through the "undertaking," "assisting," "encouragement" or "toleration" by State authorities, an act of terrorism
by whomsoever performed remains a criminal act nonetheless. The
imputation of the act to a State serves to aggravate the nature and
seriousness of the offense so as to elevate it from an ordinary international crime required by treaty to be made punishable under domestic law, to the top category of the gravest crimes, an "offence
against the peace and security of mankind," with all the grave consequences that inevitably follow.
The 1937 Convention obliged State parties not only to refrain
from any acts designed to encourage terrorist activities but also to
prevent the acts in which terrorist activities take shape. 16 Thus,
States undertook thereby to prevent and punish activities of this
nature. A breach of such an undertaking does not entail responsibility of a State for the commission of the act or organization of
activities by individuals who are neither authorities nor officials of
the State. Nevertheless, knowledge and toleration of such activities
may amount to a breach of duty engaging State responsibility for
failure to prevent the occurrence of such unlawful activities on its
territory. A closer examination of concrete examples in State practice may help clarify some of the inherent obscurities and ambiguities. Given the existence of an act of terrorism, our concern may
still be precluded by the noninternational or nontransnational
character of the act.
C.

"ACTS OF TERRORISM" AND "INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM"

An act of terrorism may constitute but an ordinary crime or
criminal offense if committed wholly within the boundary of one
State and not directed against any other State. 17 In a sense, every
16. See Draft Code, supra note 3, art. 1, para. 1, at 18. Examples are numerous. Libya
has been known to encourage terrorist activities directed against Egypt, Chad and the
United States. On the other hand, the United States together with the People's Republic of
China, Iran and Pakistan have been accused by a socialist country of training and assisting
Afghan terrorists whom we believe to be freedom-fighters in their struggles to liberate Afghanistan from Soviet domination. See Secretary General's Report on Terrorism, U.N. Doc.
(1985).

17. For instance, the Tylenol terror was confined to the United States and not in-
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crime is an offense directed against the society or the State. Indeed, some offenses are specifically labeled offenses against the
State, whether in form of offenses against national security, such
as sedition or high treason, or offenses against economic or financial stability. According to the definition given above, an "act of
terrorism" is at least a crime calculated to create a state of fear in
the mind of individuals, groups or the general public. It is also directed against another state. 18
An "act of terrorism," however, is elevated to the status of
"international terrorism" solely on account of its "internationality." It therefore presupposes the involvement of at least two
States, the State responsible for the terrorist act directly or by imputation and the victim State against which the terrorist act is
directed.
History has known notorious instances of terrorism, although
not always categorized as such an offense. Thus, we have heard of
Ivan the Terrible as distinguished from Richard the Lion Heart.
In post-revolutionary France the expression "la regne de terreur"
has been used to describe the terrifying occurrences. 19 During
World War II, a resolution was adopted by the Allied governments
condemning German Terror and demanding retribution. 20 Subsetended to cause injury outside this country, unless the product was exported abroad. The
element of intent has also to be taken into account.
18. Thus, the killing of an American national in the Achille Lauro incident is said to be
directed, inter alia, against the United States. The definitions here examined represent international efforts under the League of Nations and present-day United Nations. They are
essentially more objective than national efforts, such as those attributable to the United
States or the United Kingdom, which tend to protect their own nationals in contemporary
environment as prospective victims of terrorist attacks by Iranian or Libyan or the Irish
Republican Army. Thus, Americans and English are by definition not terrorists but victims
of terrorism under their respective statutes.
19. Terrorism, both as a concept and a term of art, dates back to the era of the French
Revolution and the Jacobin Reign of Terror (1793-1794). See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
216 (1911). This practice of terror provided the contemporary prototype of what has come
to be known as State terrorism or government terrorism, whereby an existing regime inflicts
severe penalties and acts of arbitrary violence on defenseless population. The most glaring
example of our time is the apartheid regime in South Africa.
20. In London, on January 13, 1942, representatives of the governments of the occupied countries of Europe then established in London, and of the Free French National Committee, met at St. James's Palace and signed a formal resolution condemning the German
regime of terror throughout occupied Europe, recalling "that international law, and in particular the Convention signed at The Hague in 1907 regarding the laws and customs of land
warfare, do not permit belligerents in occupied countries to commit acts of violence against
civilians, to disregard the law in force, or to overthrow national institutions." See U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/368, at 28 (1983). Reference was also made to declarations on October 25, 1941 by
the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister.
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quently, a declaration was made in Moscow on German atrocities. 21
Aside from wartime terrors or terrorist acts committed during
an armed conflict, "acts of terrorism" continued long after the cessation of hostilities. Happenings in various parts of the world did
not conform to the same or similar pattern of terror connected
with post-war guerilla activities as in Greece. 22 The first notable
terrorist group known in Asia with transboundary activity were the
C.T. (Chinese, or at times Communist, Terrorists) 23 in Malaya
before and also after independence in 1957. Their purpose was to
change the regime in the country by means of terrorism. 2 • If their
activities were confined to ·the borders of Malaya without instigation or assistance or encouragement from outside, they would
amount to nothing more than ordinary bandits or highway men,
operating against local law, not unlike Robin Hood of Sherwood
Forest, except that there was no oppression against the poor on the
part of the ruling authority. In fact, it was an attempt to bring
about changes by force of terror, directed from outside against the
internal security and stability of Malaya.
The C.T. might have been the first such classic example of international terrorism. On the other hand, there had been other instances of native uprising with the aim to overthrow existing colonial government or removing alien domination. These colonial
peoples were not only denied their basic right of self-determination
as peoples but were also labeled "terrorist," such as the "Mau
21. The Moscow Declaration on German Atrocities of October 30, 1943 was signed by
President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Chairman Joseph Stalin, referring to the
atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded executions being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces,
and to the brutalities of Hitlerite domination as "the worst form of government by terror."
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/368, at 29 (emphasis added).
22. After the close of hostilities in World War II, Communist guerillas were infiltrated
into Greece across the border from Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Proposals by the
Commission of Investigation to set up a permanent frontier commission were rejected by
Soviet double veto in the Security Council. See 2 U.N. SCOR Special Supp. (No. 2) at 15657; 2 U.N. SCOR (Nos. 51-64) at 1126-1547; see also G.A. Res. 109(11) (Oct. 2, 1947), setting
up a special committee to observe compliance by the four governments concerned with recommendations of the General Assembly.
23. These were Communist-inspired bandits of Chinese origin taking hostages and .demanding extortions from among the Chinese population in Malaya in order to embarrass the
British Colonial Government and subsequently its Malayan successor, the Federation of
Malay States.
24. Chinese inspired Communist Parties were formed in almost every country in
South-East Asia, notably Burma, Laos, Thailand, Malay, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines. Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk were both supported by Peking from the start. The fate
and growth of the Chinese oriented communist parties in South-East Asian countries have
been discussed in other works. See, e.g., Rahman, The Communist Threat in Malaysia and
Southeast Asia, PACIFIC COMMUNITY 8 (July 1977); FOREIGN AFFAIRS MALAYSIA No. 3, at 1.
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Maus" in Africa or even the Algerians and the Indo-Chinese before
their respective independence, struggling to liberate their nationals
from the yoke of colonial oppression. 25 The process of decolonization could indeed be painful; the deliverance of an independent
nation has often entailed far greater labor pain for the reluctant
colonial power than the delivery of an overgrown child by an uncooperative mother. National liberation movements could avail
themselves of external assistance with world-wide endorsement. 26
One crucial point has been rendered crystal clear beyond any
shadow of suspicion. General Assembly Resolution 3103(XXVIII),
which enumerates the basic principles of the legal status of the
combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and
racist regimes, has succeeded in precluding national liberation
movements from the presumption of guilt. There is less possibility
of converting "freedom-fighters" into "terrorists," and "mercenaries" into "national heroes." The four categories are so far apart
that no confusion would seem likely today, although the recent
past was still contaminated with such distortions. Freedom-fighters
are now accepted as national heroes, while mercenaries have been
outlawed in Africa, and condemned as criminals. Mercenarism is a
crime, when used to oppose national liberation movements. 27
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Resolution 3103(XXVIII) run:
5. The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the
25. See, e.g.,lmplementation of Declaration 1514 on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 2465(XXIll) para. 8 (Dec. 20, 1968). This resolution declared the practice of using mercenaries against movements of national liberation and
independence to be a punishable criminal act. See also G.A. Res. 2548(XXIV) (1969), declaring that the continuation of colonial rule threatens international peace and security and
that the practice of apartheid and all forms of racial discrimination constitute a crime
against humanity, and reiterating the criminality of the use of mercenaries against movements for national liberation and independence. Of late, mercenaries were also used by foreign powers to invade the independent Republic of Seychelles in an attempt to overthrow
its legitimate government. Compare G.A. Res. 2708(XXV) (1970), and O.A.U. Convention
for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, Libreville, June 30, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
368, at 64-66 [hereinafter O.A.U. Convention].
26. See G.A. Res. 1514(XV) (1960), on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and subsequent resolutions on the implementation and accelaration of the
decolonization process. G.A. Res. 2465(XXIll) (Dec. 20, 1968); G.A. Res. 2548(XXIV) (Dec.
11, 1969); G.A. Res. 2708(XXV) (Dec. 14, 1970).
27. The first Algerian delegation to the United Nations was headed by Mohamed Ben
Balla, leader of the FLN, at one time the most dreaded "terrorist" by French standard. A
similar path was followed by many a statesman in Africa and the so-called Middle East, by
the Zulus and the Mau Maus, and by the Jews in Palestine, each of whom has had to struggle hard to earn national liberation and independence. Once treated as "terrorists" by former colonial masters, they are today respected and proclaimed world-wide as national
heroes.
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national liberation movements struggling for their freedom and independence from the yoke of colonialism and alien domination is
considered to be a criminal act and the mercenaries should accordingly be punished as criminals.
6. The violation of the legal status of the combatants struggling
against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes in the
course of armed conflicts entails full responsibility in accordance
with the norm of international law. 28

Between mercenaries and national liberations movements, the
position has been made unquestionably clear. Mercenaries or hired
killers fight for reward, not to achieve independence or national
liberation, but rather to prolong colonial and alien domination or
racist regimes. 29 On the other hand, this clarity will in no way justify "acts of terrorism" or "international terrorism" by whomsoever committed.
Regulation of the use of force in an armed conflict in the
course of liberation, as in other instances of armed conflict, does
not necessarily guarantee absence of violations of the laws and customs of war by either side of the combatants. Suffice it to confirm
that such violations entail State responsibility under international
law. 80 Not only the State that violated the regulation would be responsible, but the insurgents or rebels considered to be protected
by the Geneva Conventions of 194981 and additional Protocols of
28. G.A. Res. 3103(XXVIII), Dec. 12, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/368, at 90. On the other
hand, combatants are also required to observe the laws and customs of armed conflict without exception.
29. See, e.g., O.A.U. Convention, supra note 25, at 64-69. Compare Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, adopted by the Diplomatic Conference
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/368, at 95; 1977 U.N. Juam. Y.B. ch. IV.
30. Every State is held responsible for its internationally wrongful act. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Part I, (1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N pt. 2, at 26-63 (provisionally adopted by the International Law Commission at first reading). Take special notice of
Chapter I: General Principles, Articles 1-4, and Chapter II: The "Act of the State" under
International Law, Articles 5-15.
31. The Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Protection of War Victims. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.l.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.l.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, T.l.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.l.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287. See, e.g., Article 3 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, which imposes on each Party to the armed conflict, as a
minimum, the obligation to treat humanely all persons who are "hors de combat" (out of
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1977 82 could be equally liable. Violations in the form of taking of
hostages, torture, killing of hostages, or reprisals could be punishable as offenses against the laws and customs of war, and could take
the form of "acts of terrorism."
There are also other "acts of terrorism" which are not exclusively taking place within one and the same State, but may have
transboundary connections or networks that are regional or global.
Just as the pirates jure gentium operate on the high seas, outside
national jurisdiction of any State, an organized band of terrorists
may have their planning and operational sites in more than one
country. The Red Army or other extremist groups of Japan, 88 the
Baader-Meinhof gang 84 in the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Mafia or the Brigatto Rosso of Italy (Red Brigade) need not stay
put at one headquarters within one country, they often cross national borders.
A gang of terrorists like the Mafia or the Red Brigade, which
could operate for private ends or for loftier motives, could commit
within Italy an act of terrorism such as the assassination of the
Anti-terrorist Commander in Sicily, 86 or the kidnapping and subsecombat) by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
32. Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Confiict: Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, Aug. 12, 1949, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (adopted June 8,
1977). Protocol I, Part III, Section I (Methods and Means of Warfare), Article 35 (Basic
rules), provides in paragraph 2, "[i]t is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering," and in paragraph 3, "[i]t is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which
are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment." See also id. arts. 36-37.
33. A suicide crash by a monoplane into a private home and other explosions were attempted at various industrial complexes, such as the Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, sometimes
by the leftist group in protest against capitalism, other times by the rightist group urging
for more militant actions on the part of the government and other enterprises.
34. See, e.g., the Klaus Croissant Extradition Case, 106 JOURNAL ou DROIT INTERNATIONAL 91 (1979). The Conseil d'Etat, Section du Contentieux, Fr., upheld the decision of
the French Government to extradite Klaus Croissant, a German national closely associated
with the Baader-Meinhof terrorist gang, in response to the request made by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the ground that the charge of furnishing aid
to persons who committed crimes was not political in its purpose, although the purpose was
described in the international arrest warrant as "to topple the established order of the Federal Republic of Germany." Id. at 96. See Le Figaro, Nov. 17, 1977, at 17, col. 3; Le Monde,
Oct. 2-3, 1977, at 7, col. 1; Le Monde, Oct. 5, 1977, at 16, col. 5; Le Monde, Nov. 26, 1977, at
1, col. 3; see also Carbonnau, Terrorist Acts, Crimes or Political Infractions? An Appraisal
of Recent French Extradition Cases, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 265-97.
35. The Italian General was waylaid and assassinated in his own car on his way home
in the fall of 1982. The case was reported in Italian newspapers and the European edition of
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quent assassination of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro of Italy, 86
could be considered as being directed against the territorial government or the home State. On the other hand, the taking hostage
of General Dozier, 37 N~TO Commander of Logistics in Northern
Italy, although motivated by private gains, was nevertheless directed against another State (i.e., the United States, of which General Dozier was a national) as well as against an international organization (NATO). Regardless of the political motivations in all
three cases mentioned above, the offenses committed in Italy could
clearly be regarded as acts of terrorism. Of the three instances,
however, the Dozier case was apparently the only example of "international terrorism," since the hostage was a foreign (non-Italian) national and the act was directed against another State.
These three instances may be distinguished from yet another
category of terrorist acts, such as, the kidnap of the heir of Bulgari38 for a ransom, which took place in Italy as well as outside
Italy, for the place of payment of the extortion money was made in
Switzerland despite official efforts to intercept any transfer of
money from Italy. Since there are multiple venues of the crime, the
locus delicti commissi was duplicated in more than one State. This
could be viewed in a sense as an international crime or rather an
act of transboundary terrorism. But it was for purely private ends,
and as such would not be of direct concern to the present inquiry,
which, by definition, excludes acts of transboundary terrorism not
directed against any other State, but against an individual or family to extort money or undue advantages.
Further instances could be cited which illustrate the international character of the acts of terrorism. The explosion which
killed the President of the Republic of Korea and injured many
members of his party while on a state visit in Rangoon, Burma in
198239 was clearly directed against the Republic of Korea, as well
as incidentally against the Union of Burma, as the host State responsible for the safety and security of the visiting head of State
and dignitaries. The fact that the terrorists were agents of the
the Herald Tribune.
36. See, e.g., Red Brigade Hunt Intensifies in France, Int'l Herald Tribune, Sept. 4,
1979, at 5, col. 1 (the Piperno extradition case in connection with the assassination of Aldo
Moro).
37. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1982, at 3, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1981, at A3, col. 1.
38. The incident was reported in local press as well as in the European edition of the
Herald Tribune in 1984.
39. See debate in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 1982.
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Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not make the act any
less international. Similarly, the shooting of a Korean jet liner over
the Pacific by Soviet shore missiles on August 31, 1983 was not a
purely domestic incident, as the act entailed far-reaching repercussions in the history of civil aviation.'' 0 Nor was the destruction of
the Rainbow Warrior, a vessel of Greenpeace, in a harbor irt New
Zealand, by French agents ever to be deemed within France's domestic jurisdiction. 41
The international character of the act of terrorism attributable
to a State in all these cases fit the definition of "international terrorism." Moreover, they constitute instances of State terrorism,
par excellence. The mining of a harbor in time of peace for
whatever reason has been found by the International Court of Justice to constitute breaches of international obligations entailing international responsibility of the Respondent, the United States of
America. " 42
40. See, e.g., the decision of the Pilot Association boycotting landing in Moscow, and
other counter-measures adopted by the Council of Europe. Efforts were made to prevent the
recurrence of such incidents by establishing points for monitoring routing services in Japan,
U.S.S.R., and the United States to coordinate the locality of each civil aircraft. See Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Air Traffic Control, July 29, 1985, United States-Japan-U.S.S.R., 25 l.L.M. 74 (entered into force Oct. 8, 1985). For the agreement among Air
Traffic Control Centers implementing the memorandum, see 25 l.L.M. 77 (1986); see also
Documents Concerning Korean Air Lines Incident, 22 l.L.M. 1109 (1983); INT'L C1v1L AVIATION 0RG., REP. REGARDING KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT, 23 l.L.M. 864 (1984); Amendment to
the Convention on International Civil Aviation with Regard to Interception of Civil Aircraft,
May 10, 1984, 23 l.L.M. 705.
41. On July 10, 1985, members of the French Directorate General of External Security
(DGSE) placed detonating devices aboard the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior, docked
in Aukland harbor, New Zealand. The vessel was planning to sail to French Polenesia to
protest against nuclear testing about to be carried out there. The explosion resulted in the
death of one Dutch crew member and total destruction of the vessel. Two French agents
were arrested, tried, and sentenced to a term of ten years imprisonment by the New Zealand
Chief Justice, for manslaughter and wilful damage to the ship. The dispute between New
Zealand and France was settled on ihe basis of a Ruling Pertaining to the Difference between France and New Zealand Arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair, Report of the
Secretary-General to the U.N. General Assembly, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 6, U.N.
Doc. A/41/1 (1986). The final settlement of the amount of reparation and compensation is
still under arbitration. See also Commonwealth Bulletin, Apr. 1986, at 380; D. Roe1E, EYES
OF FIRE: THE LAST VOYAGE OF THE Rainbow Warrior (1987); Sawyer, Rainbow Warrior: Nuclear War in the Pacific, 8(4) THIRD WORLD Q. 1325 (Oct. 1986).
42. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
l.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 26, 1986). The Court found in favor of the Applicant, Nicaragua, on at least 14 different counts. In particular, Count (6) by twelve votes to three, the
court decided that, by laying mines in the internal and territorial waters of the Republic of
Nicaragua during the months of 1984, the United States has acted against the Republic of
Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force
against another State, not to intervene in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to
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D.

TYPES
OF
TERRORISM''

OFFENSES

ASSOCIATED

[Vol. 14:141
WITH

"INTERNATIONAL

Having to some extent drawn a boundary line between "international or transboundary terrorism" of relevant interest to our inquiry and those that need not detain further attention, we may
next examine briefly the types of offenses which may constitute
acts of international terrorism meriting the most attentive consideration. Broadly speaking, within the scope of the internationally
accepted definition, acts constituting international terrorism, for
present purposes, may be classified under the following categories
of offenses:
1. Offenses against internationally protected persons," 3

such as the kidnapping or assassination of a head of
state.
2. Taking of hostages"" or seizing a public building,
such as an embassy or a consulate.
3. Wilful destruction of, or damage to public property
devoted to public purpose,"& such as explosion of
bombs in a courthouse or a department store.
4. Wilful acts calculated to endanger the lives of mem-

bers of the public,"6 such as throwing grenades or firing
machine guns in a crowded airport.
5. Hijacking of aircraft, vessels and other public
means of transport. 47
6. The manufacture, obtaining, possession or supplying
of arms, ammunition, explosives or harmful substances
interrupt peaceful maritime commerce. See id. para. 292, at 137-42.
43. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.l.A.S.
No. 8532, 13 l.L.M. 41 [hereinafter Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes]; European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, T.S. No. 90,
15 l.L.M. 1272 [hereinafter European Convention].
44. See International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, G.A.
Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23, reprinted in 18 l.L.M. 1456
(1979); European Convention, supra note 43, art. l(D).
45. See European Convention, supra note 43, art. l(E); Draft Code, supra note 3, Art.
2, Doc. A/CN.4/368, para. 2 at 18.
46. See Geneva Convention of 1937, supra note 3, Art. 2, para. 3.
47. See Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.l.A.S. No. 7192, 10 l.L.M. 133 [hereinafter Hague (Hijacking) Convention of 1970].
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with a view to the commission of any of the above
offenses. 48
To this list should also be added acts which constitute the
commission of any of the above offenses, such as:
(1) conspiracy to commit any such act enumerated in numbers
one to five above;"'
(2) any incitement to any such act, if successful;50
(3) direct public incitement to any such act whether or not
successful;u
(4) wilful participation in any such act; 52
(5) assistance, knowingly given, towards the commission of
any such act; 58
(6) any attempt to commit any such act. 54
III.
A.
1.

THE PROBLEM OF JURISDICTION

THE PROBLEM STATED

The Conceptual Problem

The problem connected with jurisdiction is manifold. To begin
with, there seems to be a basic conceptual problem inherent in the
expression "jurisdiction." Secondly, the use of the term may also
vary with the different meanings ascribed to it by the user. Lastly,
there is traditionally more than one type of jurisdiction that appears to be highly relevant to any consideration of international
terrorism. The problem whether a State has jurisdiction to arrest,
to prosecute or to punish an alleged offender, may therefore be
tackled in these separate but closely related connections.
A conceptual problem of paramount importance surrounds the
expression "jurisdiction." The term has been used in several legal
contexts, not necessarily interconnected. In its etymological sense,
"jurisdiction" is a combination of "jus" - "juris" and "dicere" "dictio," literally the statement of the law or power to determine
the right or what the law is on the point at issue, or the determination of the right or interest in question or the interpretation and
48. See Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, supra note 11,
art. 2, para. 5, at 18.
49. See id. art. 3, para. 1, at 19.
50. Id. art. 3, para. 2, at 19.
51. Id.
52. Id. art. 3, para. 4, at 19.
53. Id. art. 3, para. 5, at 19.
54. Id. art. 3, para. 4, at 18.
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application of the law. H
In international law, even from the classics of the law of nations, the term "jurisdictio" or jurisdiction has been equated with
"imperium" or sovereignty, as in the maxim par in parem non
habet imperium or non habet jurisdictionem. In this sense, jurisdiction may be said to constitute one aspect of "sovereignty," or
governmental authority of the State, for which an equivalent
phrase adopted by the International Law Commission in connection with State responsibility is perogatives de la puissance
publique.r.e
In private international law, the expression "jurisdiction" refers either to the term "legal system" or the territory in which an
autonomous legal system operates. This meaning is conceptually
different from that contained in the idea of imperium.
In constitutional law, jurisdiction is exercisable by the three
branches of the government more or less in conformity with the
theory and practice of the separation of powers. G7 This may correspond more closely to the different meanings ascribed to the different types of jurisdiction under international law.GS
The different uses of the same term in various branches or disciplines of the law have created some confusion of thought as well
as of expression. Further complication has been added as the result
of different usages of that terminology in the same context, or discipline, in public international law.Gt
55. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS ch. 10, at 820-90 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter L. HENKIN]. "Jurisdiction is commonly used to describe authority to affect legal interests." Id.
56. See, e.g., Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 7, para. 2, reprinted in [1980)
2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 31. Here, reference is made to an entity, which is empowered by the
internal law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority (the French
equivalent being, les prerogatives de la puissance publique or in Spanish, las prerogativas
del podero publico, found in the French Annuaire and the Spanish Anuario, respectively).
57. See A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS (1984).
58. See L. HENKIN, supra note 55, at 820-21. Jurisdiction may be defined on several
levels, namely, under municipal law and under international law. Under municipal, the legislative, judicial and executive powers of the federal branches of government are defined
first in the constitution, which sets the limits beyond the various branches of the federal
and state government may not go. Conflict of laws rules within a federal union often define
the limits of legislative, judicial and executive jurisdiction, not necessarily conterminous
with constitutional limits.
59. Users do not always express themselves with sufficient clarity when adopting the
term "jurisdiction." See id. at 820. Usages of publicists in this country merely distinguish
between enfo~cement and prescriptive jurisdiction which appears to include power to adjudicate. Id.
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2. The Problem of Interpretation of the Types of Jurisdiction in
International Law
The meanings of jurisdiction in international law also vary
with the types of jurisdictional authority exercised by the different
organs of the State. In principle, it would be misleading and inaccurate not to recognize and identify the types of jurisdiction involved or invoked. There are at least three aspects of jurisdiction
in the context of international terrorism.
(a) Prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction refers to the authority to prescribe the rules of conduct for individuals and officials
within or without the State, as well as for the State organs, agencies or instrumentalities of government. This capacity to legislate
or to prescribe rules of conduct is not confined to the power exercisable by the legislatures, but also by other institutions of government such as administrative agencies, and even courts.
(b) Adjudicative or judicial jurisdiction means the power to
adjudicate or determine a legal conflict or dispute, such as the authority of a court of law to decide whether an offense has been
committed or to determine the guilt or reaffirm the innocence of
an accused person. Jurisdiction may be found lacking in any given
case on several grounds, either ratione personae or ratione materiae. 60 Jurisdiction to adjudicate may be defined as the authority of
a State to subject particular persons or things to its judicial
process. 81
(c) Executive or enforcement jurisdiction denotes the administrative or executive authority of the State to prevent and suppress the commission of any offense against the law of nations or of
any other crime, including the power to arrest, apprehend, prosecute and execute orders or judgments of the court. 82 This is sometimes defined as "the capacity ... to enforce a rule of law, whether
this capacity be exercised by the judicial or the executive
branch. "88
60. Jurisdiction may be based on ratione materiae, i.e., on the ground of or by reason
of the subject matter or nature of the offense, its seriousness, its place of commission, the
punishability of the offense and its territorial connection. Jurisdiction may also be based on
ratione personae, i.e., on the person or personality, including status and nationality of the
alleged offender.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 6 pt. I, introductory note
(1965). The Restatement prefers the expression jurisdiction to adjudicate over the term judicial jurisdiction.
62. Id. Jurisdiction to enforce also c.overs the power to cooperate with other nations in
the investigation, apprehension and extradition or exchange of alleged offenders or convicts.
63. Id. Jurisdiction to enforce is defined as the authority of a State "to use the re-
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Thus, the terms "legislative," "judicial" and "executive" jurisdiction may be used interchangeably with the expressions "jurisdiction" to prescribe, to adjudicate and to enforce, regardless of
the governmental institution exercising the power.
B.

CAUSES OF THE JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM

Several causes seem to have contributed to the problem of jurisdiction in connection with international terrorism. Before analyzing the problem or attempting any solution, it appears useful to
examine the origin or root-causes of the problem which may be
attributable to a number of salient facts.
1. Absence of a Comprehensive Set of Rules in International
Law Defining with Precision all Types of Jurisdiction

International law has not developed or prescribed a complete
set of norms delimiting the scope of jurisdiction that each State
may exercise whether in the form of jurisdiction to legislate, to adjudicate or to enforce. 64 That is true also of international organizations which may have been vested with some of the attributes of
State jurisdiction.61 International law has been relatively silent on
the limits of prescriptive, adjudicative and executive jurisdiction of
each State or international institution in civil and criminal matters
generally, although attention has been paid more particularly to
the outer-limits of State jurisdiction in criminal matters. 66
2. Lack of Uniformity in State Practice

Each State is sovereign within its own borders. Yet, States
have prescribed laws with extraterritorial effects; have sought to
adjudicate disputes in civil litigation with little or no territorial
connection or to prosecute and try persons accused of crimes committed outside their territorial confines, and at times even to ensources of government to induce or compel compliance with its law."
64. See L. HENKIN, supra note 55, at 821. Compare the classic dictum of Chief Justice
Marshall in Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812). Jurisdiction appears to be unlimited even by territorial confines of the State.
65. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations, Mar. 22, 1986, Conf. A. 129/15.
66. More emphasis is placed on the validity or impropriety of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on considerations other than territorial connections as in the famous Mexican
case concerning Mr. Cutting, an American national accused of criminal libel in Texas, in
1887. See 2 J. MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST § 201, at 228 (1906); The Lotus Case,
Concerning Criminal Negligence on the High Seas, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 5 (1927).
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force such decisions beyond their national borders. 67 The extent to
which States tend to legislate, adjudicate and enforce measures
outside their territory is far from uniform. While for historical or
geopolitical reasons some countries are shy of exercising jurisdiction extraterritorially, others appear to enjoy such extravagant luxury of extraterritorial jurisdiction.68 The end results point to a
marked absence of consistency in State practice.
3. Emergence of the Jurisdictional Problem
Divergency in State practice regarding the limits of national
jurisdiction in different forms has given rise to a serious problem
in connection with the need to arrest, try and punish international
terrorists. The problem of jurisdiction may arise in more ways than
one.
(a) The gap or vacuum in national jurisdiction
Because of the diversity of State practice in the quality and
extent of the authority to prescribe, the capacity to adjudicate and
the power to enforce, it may happen that in a given circumstance
or case, no State appears to have jurisdiction or to be competent to
exercise jurisdiction at a particular phase of the proceedings. For
example, before the Hague Convention of 1970,69 a terrorist hijacking an aircraft in flight over the high seas could be free of any
jurisdiction upon landing in a third State that had no provision in
its criminal code making hijacking or seizure of aircraft in flight or
over the high seas a punishable offense. The offense was commited
in no man's land, that is, beyond national jurisdiction of any State.
67. For criminal matters, an example would be the Eichman case. See Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction Following Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent in International Law, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1087 (1974), concerning the amendment of
Israel Penal Law in 1972, adopted by the Knesset on the 6th Nisau, 5732 (Mar. 21, 1972),
Sefer Ha-Chukkim 52. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) 404; Security Council Report to the
General Assembly in the Eichman Case, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 2) at 19-24, U.N. Doc.
A/4494; Security Council Resolution S/4349. Compare Anti~Terrorism Act of 1986: Hearing
on H.R. 4294 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
68. After the establishment of the capitulations regime or extraterritoriality in Turkey,
China, Japan and Siam, the Western powers, including the United States and subsequently
even Japan, seemed to enjoy extraterritorial rights and jurisdiction over their respective
nationals in distant Asian Lands. See British Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Viet.
286, ch. 37, §§ 1-2, providing for inter alia, exercise of jurisdiction in foreign country and
power to assign jurisdiction to British courts in cases within the act.
69. Hague (Hijacking) Convention of 1970, supra note 47. M~re than 120 States have
ratified the Convention.
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There was no jurisdiction to arrest, or prosecute as the act was not
considered a criminal offense; hence there was no subject matter
jurisdi~tion to begin with. Nor would the terrorist be arrested
where landing occurred, since there was no authority to arrest a
person who in the eyes · of the State had committed no offense
against its law or the law of nations.
The situtation has improved somewhat in like circumstances
for countries having ratified the Hague Convention of 1970.70
There would be an obligation under Articles 2 and 4 of the Convention to pass legislation to create jurisdiction to prosecute and
punish such offenses as hijacking or seizure of aircraft in flight by a
number of States including the State of registration as well as the
State in whose territory the aircraft has landed, the State of destination, where the alleged offender is present, and the State of
transit after landing. 71 Of course, the State of registration normally
would have jurisdiction, the problem was the lack of capacity to
arrest the accused without his physical presence in the territory of
the forum State after the commission of the offense. Such a gap or
vacuum does exist and may exist in countless imaginable cirucmstances, and States have endeavored to bridge the gap or to fill the
vacuum with jurisdiction.
In some systems, there may be jurisdiction to prosecute and to
try an accused person in absentia, but without physical presence
of the accused person, enforcement or punishment would not be
possible. This defect could be cured by cooperation of a third State
through the process of extradition which presents another major
problem in the suppression and punishment of international terrorism. If at any time during any stage of the proceedings a vacuum in the jurisdiction occurs, the defect becomes incurable. Extradition cannot proceed if, in the substantive law of the requested
State, the offense is not considered to be a crime or punishable
offense, or indeed an extraditable offense. 72
70. Id. An increasing number of States are now either jointly owning or operating national airlines, such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden (SAS); individually operating national lines, such as Thailand, Singapore, Kuwait, Republic of Korea and U.S.S.R.; or supporting private-owned national carriers or flag lines, such as the United States (TWA,
PanAm, United, American, etc.), United Kingdom (British Caledonia), France (UTA) and
the Netherlands (KLM).
71. See id. arts. 1-3, 7-8.
72. For a more detailed examination of the problem of extradition, see infra notes 13353 and accompanying text.
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(b) Overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction

Another problem area may be identified in connection with
the extension of jurisdiction by one State which overlaps that of
another State, both claiming to exercise the authority to prosecute,
to adjudicate and to punish the offender. This is not uncommon in
transboundary crimes and torts where the locus delicti commissi
may cover more than one territory, or where the injured party may
have the nationality of one State, the offender being a national of
another State. Two or more States may have concurrent jurisdiction for various reasons which provide different grounds or bases
for jurisdiction. 73
In the case of concurrent jurisdiction, the State with the custody of the accused or where the defendant can be located appears
to have an upper hand in the exercise of jurisdiction if it wishes to
apprehend and prosecute, or to allow proceedings to be initiated.
Other States will have to try the case in the absence of the defendant or, in penal matters, to request extradition which may or may
not be accorded, 7" depending on numerous factors to be taken into
consideration. In the final analysis, physical presence of the defendant or the accused is crucial in criminal cases although not indispensable in civil matters. The State with the custody of the alleged offender may have several options, aut dedere (to extradite),
73. Not only is this common in all cases of transboundary crimes or conspiracy taking
place in more than one State, but in all cases involving members of foreign visiting forces;
the .local criminal courts as well as the commanding officer of the sending State would retain
concurrent jurisdiction over the alleged offenders. Arrangements are often made in the form
of Status of Forces Agreements, as in the following treaties: Agreement under Article VI of
the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security: Facilities and Areas and the Status of
United States Armed Forces in Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, United States-Japan, 11 U.S.T. 1652,
T.l.A.S. No. 4510; Agreement Respecting the Status of the Korean Service Corps, Feb. 23,
1967, United States-Korea, 18 U.S.T. 249, T.l.A.S. No. 6226. See also Status of NATO
Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.l.A.S. No. 2846; Application of NATO
Status of Forces Agreement to United States Forces at Leased Bases, Apr. 28, 1952, United
States-Canada, 5 U.S.T. 2139, T.l.A.S. No. 3074; Agreement Regarding the Status of Personnel of Military Assistance Advisory Group and Offshore Procurement Program, Dec. 12,
1956, United States-Denmark, 9 U.S.T. 271, T.l.A.S. No. 4002; Agreement Regarding the
Status of Military Assistance Advisory Group, Apr. 13, 1954, United States-Norway, 5
U.S.T. 619, T.l.A.S. No. 2950; Agreement Concerning the Status of the United States Forces
in Greece, Sept. 7, 1956, United States-Greece, 7 U.S.T. 2555, T.l.A.S. No. 3649; Agreement
Regarding the Stationing of United States Armed Forces in the Netherlands, Aug. 13, 1954,
United States-Netherlands, 6 U.S.T. 103, T.l.A.S. No. 3174; Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Forces in Turkey, June 19, 1951, United States-Turkey, 5 U.S.T. 1465,
T.l.A.S. No. 3020.
74. For a more detailed examination of the problem of extradition, see infra notes 13353 and accompanying text.
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aut judicare (to prosecute, adjudicate), or to release the detainee
on various grounds including political expediency or humanitarian
consideration. n
To facilitate closer cooperation in this area, a series of bilateral treaties has been negotiated and concluded by States to make
appropriate adjustment with regard to priority or necessity to
bring to justice a person responsible for a crime. 76 Multilateral conventions or regional arrangements sometimes provide for the allocation or division of concurrent jurisdiction. 77
(c) Confiict of jurisdictions

The problem is more acute when overlapping jurisdiction contains an element of conflict. In The Lotus Case, 78 the Court of
Turkey had tried and condemned Monsieur Demons, a Frenchman, for criminal negligence which took place on the high seas
against a Turkish vessel. The French Government objected
strongly to the exercise of Turkish jurisdiction on the ground that
the Court of the Flag State (France) had exclusive jurisdiction to
try the master or members of the crew of the S.S. Lotus, the vessel
Demons was on. This conflict had to qe resolved by the Permanent
Court of International Justice. The court by a dubious majority of
five, plus one ad hoc judge, plus the casting vote of President Max
Huber, to six, including British, French and American Judges,
found for Turkey.
To a limited extent, the decision may have been partially overruled by the adoption of a different ruling by the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, 79 as confirmed by the 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea. 80 These conventions codify ex75. For instances of actual decisions in connection with the political offense exception,
see infra notes 152-61.
76. An excellent example is the Supplementary Treaty concerning Extradition, United
States- United Kingdom, June 25, 1985, 87 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 87 (Feb. 1987) (entered into
force Dec. 23, 1986). Ratification of the treaty passed by a vote of 87-10. See 132 Cong. Rec.
9273. The United Kingdom approved the amended version on November 25, 1986. See also
Talcolt, Questions of Justice: U.S. Courts. Powers of Inquiry under Article 3(a) of the
U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 274 (1987).
77. See Status of NATO Forces Agreement, supra note 73.
78. 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10.
79. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.l.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, arts. 5-6, 11 [hereinafter 1958 Geneva Convention].
80. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
122, arts. 92, 94, 97, reprinted in 211.L.M. 1261, 1287-88 (1982). This convention was signed
by 159 .States, and was intended to replace the four 1958 Conventions on the Law of the
Sea. This part of the convention represents the codification of existing custom.
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isting rules of customary international law. The prevailing ruling
appears to be that no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted against the master or any other person in the service of
the ship in the event of a collision or other incident of navigation
concerning a ship on the high seas except before the judicial or
administrative authorities either of the flag State or of the State of
which person is a national.81 This was the ruling adopted earlier by
another Convention on Collision at Sea. 82
In a different context, however, the dictum of the court regarding the nearly unlimited power of a State to legislate, to adjudicate and even to enforce measures affecting the interests of foreigners beyond its own territories has not been rejected. On the
contrary, recent developments show an increasing tendency on the
part of States to extend their jurisdiction over crimes or torts committed by non-nationals and non-residents outside their territorial
confines, especially in order to protect the nations' interests or
those of their nationals or residents. 83
Such conflict is not often resolved by judicial instance. The
Lotus Case was an exception rather than a rule, having regard to
the treaty between France and Turkey establishing compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court in matters of conflict of jurisdiction, resulting from differing interpretation of the bilateral treaty,
81. See id. art. 97, para. 1, at 1288; 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 79, art. 11(1).
82. The Brussels Maritime Convention of 1952 for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collisions, 439 U.N.T.S. 233; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 502 (rev. tent. draft no. 3, 1982), on the rights
and duties of the flag State.
83. See, e.g., Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, H.R. 4294, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986). This
legislation is avowedly based on the protective principle, following the adoption of the new §
351 of the U.S. Criminal Code. See 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1971). This section covers offenses
directed at members of Congress, and makes it an indictable offense for a foreigner to attack
a member of U.S. Congress anywhere in the world, since the U.S. Government protested
against the passive nationality principle relied upon by Mexico in the Cutting case in 1887,
exactly 100 years ago. See 2 J. MooRE, supra note 66, § 201, at 228.
France reluctantly adopted a change of heart by similarly amending its Code of Penal
Procedure on July 11, 1975 (D.L., 1978-79), half a century after vainly instituting proceedings against Turkey in 1927, in The Lotus Case.
The United Kingdom has also abandoned its former position as reflected in its objection to the Netherlands position in the Costa Rica Packet Arbitration in 1888 (87 BRITISH
AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 21, Ad. 89, and 1181), seeing that virtually all the "civilized
nations" have actually followed the traditions established by Asian, African and Latin
American practices. For the dispute concerning the extraterritorial application of the U.S.
antitrust law, see Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust
Laws, 1957 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146; Editorial, Extraterritorial Application of United States
Legislation Against Restrictive or Unfair Trade Practices, 51 A.J.l.L. 380 (1957); see also
INT'L LAW ASSOCIATION, REP. ON THE 51ST CONFERENCE 304 (1964).
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failing which there would be little opportunity for an international
judicial settlement. 84 In the absence of agreement between the parties to submit their dispute for determination by the International
Court of Justice or by arbitration, or by other means of dispute
settlement, solution would have to be found elsewhere. Negotiations or agreements between the States concerned may provide the
ultimate satisfaction to the affected parties.
C.

PROSPECTIVE SOLUTION TO THE JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM

The causes of the problem are related essentially to two possibilities: absence of jurisdiction and overlapping or conflicting
jurisdiction.
A salutary solution to the absence of jurisdiction is to create
one where none has existed as in various conventions on unlawful
seizure of aircraft, 8 ~ the taking of hostages, 86 crimes against internationally protected persons including diplomatic agents, 87 or
other acts of international terrorism. 88 States have been invited to
ratify a number of terrorism-related conventions in order to fulfill
their obligations to prevent, preempt and suppress acts of terrorism by leaving no hole nor loophole in their jurisdiction.89
84. Article 15 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty of July 24, 1923, provides that "all questions of jurisdiction shall, as between Turkey and the other contracting Powers, be decided
in accordance with the principles of international law." Turkey and France agreed in a compromise to submit the dispute to the P.C.l.J ..
85. See, e.g., Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.1.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter the
Tokyo Convention]; The Hague (Hijacking) Convention of 1970, supra note 47; Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24
U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 10 I.L.M. 1151 [hereinafter Montreal (Sabotage) Convention
of 1971).
86. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, U.N. Doc.
A/34/819, reprinted in 74 A.J.I.L. 277 (1980).
87. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes, supra note 43.
88. See European Convention, supra note 43; Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 40/61 (1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 239 (1986).
89. Such a gap has existed in several penal codes which have had to be amended or
supplemented by subsequent legislation, either following adoption of an international convention or generally enabling the courts to exercise jurisdiction in furtherance of conventional or treaty provisions. For instance, Article 694 of the Code de Procedure Penale of
France, July 11, 1975 (Dalloz 1978-79) extends the seldom applied passive personality jurisdiction as well as widens the scope of protective jurisdiction to cover extraterritorial activities endangering French diplomatic and consular posts and agents. See Bigay, Les dispositions nouvelles de competence des jurisdictions fran<;aises a l'egard des infractions
commises a letranger, D.S.L. 51-52 (1976). The amendment enables the court to give effect
to obligations arising from France's ratification of anti-terrorism conventions, such as the
Hague (Hijacking) Convention of 1970, and the Montreal (Sabotage) Convention of 1971, as
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The problem area that is more complex and not easy to settle
is that of concurrent or conflicting jurisdiction. Here again, cooperation among States is required to explore and identify the most
suitable means to resolve the jurisdictional problem, including the
simplification of procedures and facilities for extradition or transfer of the alleged offenders. Clearly, the creation of an international criminal court90 may provide a solution to both problems,
either lack of or excess of jurisdiction. But the likelihood of general
acceptance of such a court is somewhat remote. 91 Besides, it would
not solve the problem in every case where there is a conflict of
jurisdiction, especially if one State insists on its exclusive right to
try the offender or that at least the offender be either extradited or
tried by the requested State.
A different solution was adopted in the colonial era where
chunks of territories were transferred to or annexed by a Western
Power with authority to legislate, adjudicate and enforce over the
entire territory. 92 In some instances short of annexation, a regime
of capitulations or extraterritoriality was established without the
possibility of conflict or concurrence of jurisdiction.93 The Colonial
Power or the State concluding such an archaic and unequal treaty
would thereby enjoy exclusive territorial jurisdiction over its own
territory and extraterritorial jurisdiction over the territory of another sovereign State to the exclusion of the latter in all matters
affecting the interests of nationals or subjects of the Colonial
Power. Such a regime was abolished in various parts of Asia including China, Japan, Thailand and Turkey by the close of World
War II, after adoption of respective penal and civil codes by Asian
well as other international conventions. See supra note 85.
90. See, e.g., Geneva Convention of 1937, supra note 3; Brierly, Do We Need an International Criminal Court?, 1927 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 81-88.
91. Not unlike the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism of
1937, the Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court was also signed in
1937 at Geneva. This was not due to a lack of enthusiasm or support, but rather to the
interruption of World War II. For earlier endeavors to set up such a court, see Brierly,
supra note 90, at 81-88; M. BASSIOUNI, DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987) .
92. For the establishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Asia in the 19th century or
regime of capitulations in Turkey, see G. GONG, THE STANDARD OF "CIVILIZATION" IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1984).
93. There could be no conflict nor indeed concurrence of jurisdiction, since the Western powers enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction over their nationals and subjects while remaining
in or traveling through the territories of Asian nations, the local sovereigns, having waived
not only their jurisdiction to try certain cases involving foreign interests, but also suspended
the application of their own laws in favor of the lex patriae or the national law of the aliens
presumed by treaty to be extraterritorial.
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countries, 94 patterned after European systems.
This solution was an imposition by Colonial Powers and was
unequal, unjust and far from satisfactory. It is now outmoded since
General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) on the granting of independence. The process of decolonization is now irreversible. 91
Thus, agreement to subject a State to a regime of extraterritoriality would be invalid today for violation of a peremptory norm
which admits of no derogation. 96
The only possible solution left open appears to rest with the
obligation of States to cooperate and to negotiate in good faith.
Many have reached agreement in the adjustment of their respective rights and obligations to request and to comply with a request
for extradition. 97 Extradition then has become an affordable solution sought after on a multilateral as well as bilateral basis. 98 It is
flexible enough to give satisfaction for all concerned. The problem
of extradition remains to be examined in the light of current legal
developments and recent State practice, especially with regard to
the exception of "international terrorism" to the "political offense
exemption" from extradition. 99
94. See, e.g., F. PIGGOTT, EXTRATERRITORIALITY: THE LAW RELATING TO CONSULAR JURISDICTION AND RESIDENCE IN ORIENTAL COUNTRIES (1892).
95. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514(XV). For the implementation of the Declaration, see G.A. Res. 2465(XXIII)
(Dec. 20, 1968); G.A. Res. 2548(XXIV) (Dec. 11, 1969); G.A. Res. 2708(XXV), (Dec. 14,
1970); Programme of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration, G.A. Res.
262(XXV) (Oct. 12, 1970).
96. See Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 1969, arts. 53, 64 (jus cogens) (entry
into force Jan. 27, 1980); WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 236-62 (3d ed.).
97. In Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933), the Supreme Court noted that
the "prindples of international law recognize no right to extradition apart from treaty."
This statement appears to reflect adequately the situation prevailing in 1933 which probably
remains true today. In the United States, extradition is a matter for the Federal Government and is governed by federal law under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184-3195; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,§§ 476-479 (rev. tent. draft no. 7, 1986); C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION (1983); MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUDIES, TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1983).
98. For examples of bilateral treaties, see, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, United StatesBrazil, Jan. 13, 1961, 15 U.S.T. 2093, T.l.A.S. No. 5691, 532 U.N.T.S. 177; Supplementary
Extradition Treaty, United States-United Kingdom, Dec. 23, 1986, 87 DEP'T OF ST. BULL. 89
(Feb. 1987). For multilateral conventions, see, e.g., Draft Convention on Extradition, 29
A.J.I.L. 81-86 (Special Supp. 1935); O.A.S. Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Feb.
25, 1981 (Caracus), O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.A/36 (SEPF), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 723 (1981);
European Agreement concerning the Application of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Dec. 4, 1979, 19 l.L.M. 325 (1980); European Convention, supra note
43; 0.A.S. Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T.
3949, T.l.A.S. No. 8413.
99. See infra notes 142-72 and accompanying text.
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PERMISSIBLE LEGAL BASES OF JURISDICTION

A survey of State practice and legal theories appears to suggest a number of permissible legal bases of jurisdiction in its entirety, including the authority to prescribe, the power to adjudicate
and the capacity to enforce. 10° For convenience, the bases of jurisdiction may be classified under five headings with some overlap. 101

A.

THE TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE

By far the most cogent and solid foundation for the exercise of
jurisdiction is the territorial principle, traceable to the more basic
principle of sovereignty as source of State authority itself. 102 Territorial sovereignty is the strongest of all the bases of jurisdiction
and would easily take precedence over other concurrent or competitive principles. As far as enforcement or executive jurisdiction is
concerned, the principle of territoriality is absolutely supreme and
as such is exclusive of other principles. The only possible exception
must be based on an equally basic norm, namely, the sovereign will
of the State itself. Thus, a State may consent to any proposition,
or agree to waive any part of its sovereign authority even in respect
of activities within its own territory in favor of the exercise by another State of an aspect of sovereignty. 103 This consent is nearly
absolute, subject only to the reservation that it does not contravene a peremptory norm out of which no State could opt through
unilateral or mutual consent. 10•
The territorial principle is valid for civil as well as criminal or
penal matters. Territoriality or the locus delicti commissi provides
a clear and firm basis for all the three forms of jurisdiction. The
last which is enforcement jurisdiction could be preventive, suppressive or even punitive. 10& In civil as well as criminal cases, the
100. See Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 A.J.I.L. 443-65 (Supp. pt. II, 1935)
(introductory comment by Professor Edwin D. Dickinson).
101. For current legal and policy problems, see, e.g., Rosenthal, Jurisdictional Confiicts between Soveriegn Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487-503 (1985).
102. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136
(1812). In dictum, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that, "[t]he jurisdiction of the nation
within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself .... All exceptions therefore to the full and complete power of a
nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself."
103. See id.
104. See supra note 96.
105. See, e.g., de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, U.S., 105 S. Ct. 2656 (1985) (action for personal injury resulting from car explosion).
See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (death by torture abroad may
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territorial connections need not be confined to one and the same
State. A crime may be committed across the boundary line as in
transfrontier offenses or transboundary torts. The territorial connections in civil liability may refer to the domicile of one of the
parties litigants, or the situs of the property in dispute or the place
of celebration of marriage or performance of a contract. Furthermore, in criminal matters the physicial notion of the locus delicti
commissi may be extended by legal fiction or theory. 106
Thus, the territorial principle, in this context, has been extended to include the following:
(a) The objective territorial principle, by reference to
the location of the object or victim of the offense or
tortious act within the State of the f orum. 101
(b) The effect doctrine, by reference to the effect produced in the territory of the forum State. 108
(c) The subjective territorial principle, by reference to
the locality of the actor, the subject or author of the
offense being located in the State of the forum. 109
(d) Plurality of localities of acts constituting the of-

fense by holding the locality of each act as the locus
delicti commissi, although other acts forming part of
the offense were performed outside the territory of
that State. 110
create basis for jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act). But see Siderman v. Republic
of Argentina, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985); Agora: What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers?, 79
A.J.l.L. 106-07 (1985) (death by torture abroad, no jurisdiction under either Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (F.S.l.A.) of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1606, or Alien Tort Claims Act, 28
§ 1350 (1982).
106. See, e.g., The Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.l.J. (ser. A) No. 10, where the locus delicti
commissi was held to be on board the Turkish vessel, based on the effect doctrine of the
territorial principle, and fictitious equation of a vessel on the high seas as a floating
territory.
107. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (1985) (territorial applicability).
108. See id. §§ (l)(e)-(f); The Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.l.J. (ser. A) No. 10. For a discussion of the objective territorial jurisdiction and the effect doctrine, see M. McDOUGAL & W.
REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE - THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
WORLD COMMUNITY 1319-68, 1385-92 (1981); Paust, The Mexican Oil Spill: Jurisdiction, Immunity, and Acts of State, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L. 239, 240-44 (1979).
109. See 2 J. MooRE, supra note 66, § 201. Moore distinguished between the locality of
the act and the locality of the actor, in the Cutting case.
110. See Hammond v. Sittel, 59 F.2d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 1932), recognizing both the
effect doctrine and the continuing act theory as bases for jurisdiction. Compare Morau v.
United States, 264 F.2d 768, 770 (6th Cir. 1920) (theft of ship or goods could constitute
continuing act for purpose of jurisdiction in every successive place to which the vessel was

u.s.c.
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(e) The fiction of territoriality, by deeming a seagoing
vessel to be a "floating territory" of a State, thereby
injury suffered on board the vessel, even on the highseas, could be regarded fictitiously on the objective territorial principle as occurring in the territory of the
flag State; likewise an aircraft could be deemed a flying
territory of the State of registration or user State. m
B.

THE NATIONALITY OR PERSONALITY PRINCIPLE

Side by side with the principle of territoriality has developed
the nationality or personality principle. Jurisdiction is exercised in
all forms and manifestations ratione personae, i.e., by reason of
the personality involved. For the status and capacity of persons,
the lex patriae would appear to govern. Nationality provides a
sound basis for jurisdiction also in criminal matters. For the present purposes, the nationality principle includes the following:
(a) Active nationality principle, by reference to the nationality of the accused or alleged offender, this is applicable to a
large extent by most systems including the common law
countries. 112
(b) Passive personality principle, by reference to the nationality of the victim of a crime or the injured party. This principle which was adopted by Mexico in the Cutting Case 113 and Turkey half a century later in The Lotus Case 114 has given rise to
much objection and criticism on the part of common law
countries. 116
It might come as a surprise to those who still resist the
passive personality principle in the combat of international terrorcarried).
111. See, e.g., The Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10. To compare the constructive presence theory, as distinct from personal presence, see Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S.
347, 362 (1912). In Hyde, constructive presence was assigned to conspirators as well as other
criminals. For jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed on board an aircraft or by an
aircraft or space object, the flag or registration connection may be reinforced by the fact of
control or use by the State responsible. The territorial connection is expanded to cover also
other forms of linkage such as registration, lease, use or control of the craft.
112. See, e.g., McCleoud v. Attorney General of New South Wales, App. Cas. 455, 457
(1891). Note especially the sweeping reservation of Lord Halsbury, "except over her own
subjects." (emphasis added).
113. See 2 J. MooRE, supra note 66, § 201.
114. See 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10; Turkish Penal Code, art. 6.
115. See R. v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63,117 (the Franconia), where Amphlett, J.A. believed it
to be an established and undisputed proposition that "a foreigner committing an offence of
any kind, even against an Englishman, on foreign territory cannot be tried for it in an English Court."
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ism to learn that even more than half a century ago the trend had
already been against such resistance. There were even then more
countries applying than rejecting it. Now the trend becomes much
more irresistible, and most enlightened governments support the
principle. The most adamant resistance has weakened in France in
Article 694 of the Code de Procedure Penale of 1975, 116 in the U.S.
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986,117 and in the Criminal Code of Thailand.118Although not every State has adopted the passive personality principle in their criminal legislation, it can no longer be said
that remaining opposition is realistic.
(c) The extended notion of nationality, attributes personality or nationality to something other than a natural person,
such as a corporate personality, a ship of war, a merchant vessel,
an aircraft or spacecraft. 119 This theory extends the scope of an
already artificial notion of nationality or juridical personality to inanimate but, intangible objects as well as incorporeal hereditaments, including several forms of assets as well as intellectual
property rights protected by the law of the State of registration
with the extended notion of nationality, jurisdiction may also be
enlarged.
C.

THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE

Reference may be made to the national interests affected or
injured by an offense, such as national security, or other vital political, economic or financial interest of the State of the forum. Jurisdiction in all forms may be exercised on the basis of the necessity
to protect one of the above national interests. 120 In the practice of
some systems, such as the one in United States, the protective
116. Law of July 11, 1975, No. 75-624, art. 189, C. PR. PEN. (Dalloz 1975). The Penal
Code specifically refers to cases where the victim of the crime is a French national.
117. Terrorist Acts against U.S. Nationals Abroad, 99th Cong. H.R. 3712, § 2332, H.R.
4288, authorizing the prosecution of terrorists who attack U.S. nationals abroad.
118. See Criminal Code of Thailand, B.E. 2499, sec. 4 (Territorial principle), sec. 5
(Objective territorial principle and effect doctrine), sec. 6 (Plurality of localities of acts), sec.
7 (Protective principle, for selected offences, security, forgery, robbery and universality principle, piracy), sec. 8 (Nationality principle (i) active and (ii) passive). Thailand's Criminal
Code appears to have adopted all the five principles without any hesitation. These provisions were taken from the best of European, Japanese and Latin American models.
119. See supra note 114. The fiction of "floating territory" of a vessel in Lotus is no
different from the fiction of nationality attributable already to the vessel through the flag it
flies.
120. See, e.g., Petersen, The Extraterritorial Effect of Federal Criminal Statutes: Offences Directed at Members of Congress, 6 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 773-802 (198283); §351 U.S. Crim. C.; 18 U.S.C. ss. 35 (1971).
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principle tends to overlap the passive personality principle long
discredited since the Cutting Case, but re-instated and revived
under the preferred designation of protective principle, as the preamble of the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, clearly reflects. 121
D.

THE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE

Reference may be made to the universal character of the offense made justiciable by the law of nations. The principle of
universality includes such offenses as piracy jure gentium, 122 genocide, 123 slave trade, 124 and narcotics trafficking. 1 n The offense
under this heading is seen as an offense against the international
community as a whole. Offenses against the peace and security of
mankind including war crimes may also be viewed in the same
light. 126 In this way, terrorism is not an infrequent phenomenon
accompanying the commission of such offenses against the law of
nations, and in most circumstances a terrorist may be arrested,
prosecuted and tried under the Universal Principle, regardless of
the locus delicti commissi, so long only as the offender can be
physically apprehended. 127 International cooperation is recom121. See Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, § 2731, H.R. 4294, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986).
Findings and Purpose: over 8,000 incidents of international terrorism were noted, more than
half were directed against American targets. A country may prosecute crimes committed
outside its boundaries that are directed against its own security or the operation of its governmental functions. Terrorist attacks on Americans abroad threaten a fundamental function of the U.S. Government; that of protecting its citizens; such attacks also threaten the
ability of the U.S. to implement and maintain an effective foreign policy; terrorist attacks
further interfere with inter-state and foreign commerce, threatening business travel and
tourism as well as trade relations.
122. See Note, Towards a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, 26
v A. J. INT L L. 723 (1986).
123. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
G.A. Res. 2670, 3 U.N. GAOR (Pt. 1) at 124, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (entered into force Jan.
12, 1951) [hereinafter Convention on Genocide].
124. See Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention Signed at Geneva On September
25, 1926, Dec. 7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, T.l.A.S. No. 3532, 182 U.N.T.S. 51. Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institution and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.l.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 (1956) .
. 125. See 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 80, arts. 108, 109;
United States v. Dominiquez, 604 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1979).
126. See, e.g., Convention on Genocide, supra note 123; Geneva Conventions Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 31; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res.
3068(XXVIII), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (entered into force July 18, 1976). The United
States was one of the four States voting against the resolution.
127. See supra note 125; 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 79, art. 19; 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 80, art. 105.
1
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mended for the suppression and punishment of the offenses.
E.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT

The principle of consent is applicable in practice for civil cases
as well as for criminal matters. For civil litigation, jurisdiction may
be exercised by several fora, among which should be mentioned the
forum rei sitae 128 (where the property is situated), the forum connexitatis129 (where there is a close connection) and the forum
prorogatum 130 (where the parties have elected to submit their disputes). The parties have not only the choice of law, but also the
choice of forum, subject to public policy of the forum or other
rules, such as forum non conveniens, non-justiciability and the act
of State doctrine. In addition, the forum State may also seize a
property or arrest a vessel ad fundandam jurisdictionem. 181 But
such seizure may not be recognized by other jurisdictions.
In criminal matters, it is not the consent of the parties that
matters. Rather the consent of the State, having priority to arrest,
prosecute and punish the offender, may afford the basis for another State, with or without physical custody of the alleged offender, to either arrest and prosecute or make a request for extradition or start extradition proceedings as the case may be. 132
128. Since the lex situs or the law of the place where the property is situated determines most if not all questions relating to property rights, the forum rei sitae is generally
the appropriate court of competence to examine most cases involving rights to immovable
and movable properties.
129. The court may be considered competent to try a case under private international
law because the proceeding involves legal issues with which by reason of the nationality of
the parties to the litigation, their domicile or situs of the property in dispute or a combination of these criteria, it has substantial if not the closest connection.
130. The theory of forum prorogatum commonly known in private international law as
the doctrine of the chosen forum is also applicable in international transactions or disputes
to which States are also parties. See, e.g., Memorial of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Alb.)
1948 I.C.J. Pleadings (1 Corfu Channel) 15 (where subsequent special agreement of the Parties replaced the Court's prorogated jurisdiction).
131. See, e.g., I Congreso del Partido Case [1981] W.L.R. 382l(H.L.) , where two sister
ships, the Playa Larga and the Marble Islands, were arrested. The court found jurisdiction
(ad fundandam jurisdictionem) against the owners and persons interested in the I Congreso
del Partido, in relation to transactions concluded by them, the I Congreso del Partido being
a ship belonging to the same Cuban fleet. The Playa Larga was owned by the Republic of
Cuba and flying the Cuban flag, while the Marble Islands was owned by a Leichstenstein
corporation and flying the Somali flag, but was under a demise charter to Mambisa, a Cuban
State enterprise. The I Congreso del Partido was a new vessel being built at a yard in
Sunderland, England, for a Liberian company, but assigned the benefit of the contract to
Mambisa, which took her delivery on behalf of the Republic of Cuba, as a trading vessel,
intended for use for trading, when she was arrested.
132. Consent is a key to a number of issues. Without consent of the territorial State, it
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Consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by another State is generally
accorded in the form of bilateral agreements between like-minded
nations or multilateral conventions within a region or sub-region of
approximate legal and cultural background. Thus, a State may exercise jurisdiction, not because the accused is arrested in its territory, nor because the offense was committed by or against its national, but more precisely and resolutely because another State,
having the custody of the accused, has agreed to deliver or surrender the alleged offender to be tried by the forum State. Had there
been no rendition, there would be no ground for jurisdiction.

V.
A.

A RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

RATIFICATION OF ANTITERRORISM-RELATED CONVENTIONS

A response to acts of international terrorism should be adequate and appropriate if international terrorism is to be discouraged. Each State has been urged to ratify the various conventions
designed to prevent and suppress offenses that are related to international terrorism, such as the taking of hostages, 133 unlawful
seizure of aircraft, 134 and offenses against internationally protected
persons including diplomatic agents 135 in compliance with Resolution 61(XL) of the General Assembly. 136 Ratification also requires
the adoption of legislation giving effect to the obligations under
the relevant conventions. 137
Such actions by States could contribute in no small measure
to international cooperation in the field of prevention and suppression of international terrorism. With the willingness on the part of
might be considered unlawful intervention to exercise enforcement jurisdiction over the territory of another State as in the Eichman case, to effect an arrest or in the Entebbe incident
to rescue hostages and protect nationals. On the other hand, with the consent of the territorial authority, Indonesian commando units successfully stormed the hijacked Garuda aircraft at Don Muang Airport in 1984, with the assistance of Thai security force.
133. Internationsl Convention ag~nst the Taking of Hostages, supra note 44.
134. See, e.g., The Hague (Hijacking) Convention of 1970, supra note 47; Tokyo Convention, supra note 85; Montreal (Sabotage) Convention of 1971, supra note 85 (recommended also by I.C.A.0.).
135. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes, supra note 43.
136. G.A. Res. 61(XL), Dec. 9, 1985, 25 l.L.M. 239.
137. Several States have adopted legislation to give effect to treaty obligations in the
absence of existing federal statute enabling the State to assume jurisdiction "by treaty."
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1984) (piracy); Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§
818, 821 (1983) (war crimes); Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) (torts). "The
legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it,
and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction of the offense." See United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
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the overwhelming majority of States to combat international terrorism, incidents of transnational terrorism should be curtailed. If
hijackers were arrested wherever the hijacked aircraft landed, hijacking could be deterred. This would require cooperation of States
to ensure safety in international air transport and navigation, 138
and not to yield to the demand of terrorists.
B.

IMPROVEMENT OF EXTRADITION PROCEDURES

The problems relating to extradition deserve the most meticulous attention. In the first place, extradition depends on the agreement or consent of the requested State to turn over or surrender
custody of an alleged offender or a condemned person to the authority of the State requesting extradition. As a matter of principle, extradition is generally carried out at the discretion of the requested State. 139 The request for extradition itself is discretionary
on the part of the executive branch of the government requesting
extradition, taking into account the existence of legal provisions
and the process of law to be fully observed. 140 There is thus an
element of discretion on both sides, as far as the executives are
concerned.
Legal provisions, if any, and procedures to be followed would
also have to be improved. 141 If according to the law, the offense is
not recognized as a crime in the requested State or the offense is
political, 142 extradition will not take place.
138. The mining of a harbor of a State disrupting international maritime trade has
been held to violate international law as well as restricting freedom and safety of navigation.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14
(Judgement of June 26, 1986).
139. The requested State, by virtue of its territorial sovereignty, is virtually free to
surrender the alleged offender or else to grant asylum. The discretion of the territorial State
is almost unqualified in spite of a binding treaty obligation aut dedere aut judicare, for the
option aut judicare is necessarily conditional on several considerations, such as, legal procedures, due process and political expediency. See supra note 75. For further discussion of the
political offense exception, see infra note 140 and accompanying text.
140. In the extradition statutes and practice of many States, procedural safeguards exist to ensure respect for human rights of the accused person, at times to the extent of allowing the court of the requested State to investigate the danger of persecution or discrimination based on race, religion or political opinions to the detriment of the fugitive. See, e.g.,
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 792-803 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 271 (1986), and
sources cited in support of the various standards surrounding the political offense exception.
141. See, e.g., New Problems of the International Legal System of Extradition with
Special Reference to Multilateral Treaties, ANNUARE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL No. 60-11, at 211-83 (1983) (session de Cambridge) [hereinafter Problems of
Extradition].
142. For recent literature in regard to the practice of the United States, see, e.g., Gil-
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Extradition is therefore based on law or statutes of the States
concerned and also on the availability of treaty provisions applicable to the situation. The problems are multiplied in this connection by a lack of uniformity in the treaty practice of States and
absence of common standards in national legislation in regard to
extraditable offenses, non-extraditability of nationals and particularly the treatment of political offenders.
Notwithstanding the discretionary element of extradition as
far as the administration or executive branch of the government is
concerned, the judicial practice of States in defining an offense as
political, or mixed or with political motivation has been neither
helpful nor instructive. 143 The case law of various countries has not
demonstrated any consistent pattern of legal developments. Contradictory theories and opposing criteria are interpreted and applied without any regularity. Persons accused of offenses which
could be classified as acts of international terrorism have sometimes been extradited and other times released on the ground that
the offenses complained of were either political, 144 with political
motivatiOn, m relatively or preponderantly political1 46 or indeed
there was potential danger of the accused being persecuted for political offenses.147 Given the jurisprudence of the more advanced
bert, Terrorism and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
695-723 (1985); Lubet & Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of
Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193-210 (1980); Stephan, Constitutional
Limits on International Rendition of Criminal Suspects, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 777-800 (1980).
143. See, e.g., Carbonneau, Terrorist Acts - Crimes or Political Infractions? An Appraisal of Recent French Extradition Cases, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 265 (19791980). Note especially the survey of State practice, the Anglo-American model; the Predominance Approach of the Swiss Courts; the French Test; and The Extradition of Transnational Terrorists by French Courts. Id. at 271-97.
144. See, e.g., In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG., mem. at 4-5 (N.D. Cal. May 11,
1979). The Federal Magistrate found that the bombing of the British Army Installation in
England by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (P.l.R.A.) was directed at the British
Army - a prime target for guerrilla warfare during an "insurrection and a disruptive uprising
of a political nature" in Northern Ireland in 1974. Compare Justice Denman's test of political offense exception: there must be a political disturbance at the time of the offense and
the offense must constitute an overt act incidental to or part of the political disburbance.
See In re Castolini [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
145. See, e.g., Vali, The Santa Maria Case, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 168-75 (Mar.-Apr. 1961)
(discussion of the Santa Maria, a steamship, that was captured by Captain Galvao as a
protest against the Portugese Government).
146. See, e.g., Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958) (per curiam) In Karadzole,
the extradition request was regarded by the Supreme Court as being for a relative political
offense.
147. See, e.g., Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, [1954] 1 Q.B. 540. The extradition
request was denied on the ground that it would result in punishment for the treasonous act
of defecting to a capitalist country and not for the common crimes of use of force. See id.
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Western civilization, such as France, the United Kingdom, the
United States, Switzerland, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, the practice cannot be said to be free of inconsistency in
this regard, 148 especially when the offenses are closely associated
with acts of international terrorism.
The very definition of "international terrorism," as it is more
generally accepted in international convention, 149 contains an inherently political element. Terrorism is an offense directed against
another State for which a State is responsible either for undertaking, assisting or tolerating its commission. Applying this definition
to offenses classified as terrorist acts, such activities would invariably appear to be politically inspired.
In actual practice, the decision of a State to extradite or not to
extradite a terrorist is likely to be prompted by political or humanitarian considerations. Among the closely associated States or in an
economically integrated community, it is easier to extradite terrorists for acts directed against a friendly government, an ally, or a
member of the same regional community. 110 On the other hand, the
State sympathizing with the cause of the insurgents for whatever
motivation is not easily persuaded to extradite terrorist-insurgents,161 whether or not they are to be labeled freedom-fighters
148. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note, at 63-114 (statement by Christopher L. Blakesley
before the House of Representatives, Judicial Committee, Mar. 4, 1986).
149. See supra notes 1-54 and accompanying text; see also M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF TERRORISM: SOME POLICY PROPOSALS, in U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMICS
& SOCIAL AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW or CRIMINAL POLICY at 44, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/
SER.M/37, U.N. Sales No. (1981).
150. See, e.g., Klaus Croissant Extradition Case, decision of the Chambre d'accusation
de Paris, 1979. In the Klaus Croissant case, where for reasons of European solidarity, extradition was granted from France to Germany, compare the Piperno and Pace case, where
extradition was ultimately allowed to Italy whose statesman and former Prime Minister
Aldo Moro was assassinated by the Rosso Brigatto.
151. Note the U.S. cases concerning extradition requested for members of the Irish Republican Army (LR.A.) to Northern Ireland. See, e.g., Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 792803 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 271 (1986); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1981);
In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal dismissed, 786 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.
1986); Jn re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979), reprinted in 132 CONG.
REc. §§ 9146-9147 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
These cases gave rise to considerable debate in the Senate preceding the amendment of
the Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, United States-United Kingdom, June 8, 1972, 87 DEP'T ST. BULL. 89 (Feb. 1987)
(entered into force on December 23, 1986). Compare the French case of Abu Daoud, allegedly an organizer of the Munich Olympics Massacres of Israeli Athletes, who entered France
under a false identity in early January, 1977 as part of an official PLO delegation. Germany
as well as Israel requested extradition of Abu Daoud. France was placed in an exceedingly
difficult situation, having taken strong public stand against transnational terrorism, and yet
wishing to cultivate relations with Arab countries. Abu Daoud was released on technical
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rather than terrorists. It is not inconceivable that a State, not
wanting to prejudice its foreign relations, may avoid the obligation
to extradite by simply deporting the alleged offender.m Deportation could be an alternative to extradition if extradition is indeed
otherwise precluded by the political character of the offense which
is clearly non-extraditable. m
C. TERRORISM AS AN EXCEPTION TO
EXEMPTION

THE POLITICAL

OFFENSE

Recent trends in State practice appear to reflect political flavor in the treatment of political offenders. Decisions to extradite or
to release the alleged offender may depend on factors that are
purely political, such as whether the fugitive is from a socialist
country, 1H whether the requesting State is an ally or a trading
partner,m or whether there is a support for his group in the asylum State. 116 It is true that due process of law dictates some participation by the judiciary whose role could be conclusive in a negative way. If the offense was considered non-extraditable by the
judicial authority, the executive could not very well override that
ruling, although there was nothing to stop a disguised form of extradition through the deportation process. 157 Therefore, the finding
by the court that the offense is extraditable will not necessarily
result in actual extradition, since the executive branch of the government could review the final process of rendition.
The political offense exemption was first seen in the AngloBelgian Treaty of 1834. 158 It is a standard clause in extradition
grounds and quickly deported to Algeria. London Times, Jan. 11, 1977, at 6, col. 4; Le
Monde, Jan. 13, 1977, at 14, col. 3.
152. See, e.g., Note, The Provisional Arrest and Subsequent Release of Abu Daoud by
French Authorities, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 495 (1977). Abu Daoud was quickly deported to
Algeria.
153. See, e.g., O'Higgins, Disguised Extradition: The Soblen Case, 27 Mon. L. REV. 521
(1964).
154. See, e.g., R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, (1955] 1 Q.B. 540; In re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic, [1952] l.L.R. 373 (Case No. 80). Note Lord Goddard's statement in
Kavic: "Those who do not wish to submit to the regime have no alternative but to escape it
by flight abroad." Id. at 37 4.
155. See, e.g., Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, [1973] A.C. 931, H.L. (E.),
where the court held that a fugitive should not be returned to the State of dispute; Cheng
was wanted for attempting to overthrow the Nationalist regime in Taiwan.
156. See supra note 151 for examples of U.S. practice in regard to the Irish cases.
157. See supra notes 151-52. In the Abu Daoud case, France preferred to avoid the
dilemma by ordering sudden deportation of Abu Daoud to Algeria.
158. 22 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 223.
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treaties and legislation. As has been seen, however, the application
of this exemption has been far from settled. 169
States are nevertheless free to conclude agreements undertaking to extradite even political offenders. 160 There is no preemptory
norm requiring non-extradition of political offenders. In actual
practice, it would be extremely difficult to conceive of such a norm,
since the concept of political offense exemption itself is not free of
confusion, susceptible to differing interpretation, hence opposite
results. 161
The current trend has been to preclude certain offenses, which
could be viewed as relatively political, from the political offense
exemption. This has been achieved in a number of conventions,
especially on the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism, 162
Seizure of Aircraft, 163 Taking of Hostages, 16" Lese Majeste, m the
Attentat Clause 166 and War Crimes. 167 Acts of terrorism have been
classified among offenses against the peace and security of man159. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXEMPTION TO EXTRADITION,
THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER 204 (1980).
160. See Agreement Relating to Common Law Criminals, An Exchange of Letters Between Cambodia and Thailand, Dec. 15, 1960, No. 5493, 382 U.N.T.S. 322-27 [hereinafter
Exchange of Letters].
161. In 1960, Thailand and Khmer (Kampuchea or Cambodia) concluded four agreements by exchange of letters with the good offices of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold
of the United Nations. Exchange of Letters, supra note 160, Nos. 5490-5493, 382 U.N.T.S.
342. Number 5492 relates to rebels and political refugees. The object was to oblige Thailand
not only to refrain from supporting Khmer rebels and assisting Cambodian political refugees within Thailand, but also to surrender political rebels who had been tried and convicted in absentia in Pnompenh. Soon after the conclusion of the exchange of letters, Cambodia requested the extradition of a certain Khmer Serei named by Sihanouk Government
as a common criminal. The fugitive sought by Cambodia died probably of fright upon learning of the conclusion of such an arrangement. Id.
162. See generally the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism,
supra note 11; the Washington Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism,
Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International
Significance (1971); and See the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,
Strasbourg, (Jan. 27, 1977) at 18-26, 101-104 and 104-108.
163. Regarding the safety of aricraft as recommended by the l.C.A.0., see the Tokyo
Convention, supra note 85; The Hague (Hijacking) Convention of 1970, supra note 47; The
Montreal (Sabotage) Convention of 1971, supra note 85.
164. The Hostages Convention 1979, at 117-120.
165. Lese Majeste is an offense against the Head of State. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 812
(5th ed. 1979).
166. See also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes, supra note 43.
167. Surrender of War Criminals and Traitors, G.A. Res. 170(11) (October 31, 1947);
Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074
(XXVIII) (Dec. 12, 1973).
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kind. Once the revised draft code is adopted, the extradition problem will be better clarified if not further simplified. 188
Bilateral treaty practice of States appears to have started a
clear trend in support of extradition of terrorists whether or not
there has been a taint of political flavor in their activities. A balanced approach must nevertheless be maintained between the interest of the international community to prevent, suppress and
punish acts of terrorism, and the interest of the individual to enjoy
asylum from political persecution and the right of self-determination of every people. Human rights should be respected and not be
sacrificed at any price. Thus, the new series of U.S. extradition
treaties, starting with the Supplementary Treaty with the United
Kingdom, precludes in its first article from the political offense exemption five categories of offenses. 189 However, article 1 is subject
to the reservation of article 3: "There would be no extradition if
the request was made 'with a view to try or punish him (the alleged offender) on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his
trial, or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by
reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions.' " 170
This innovation is not a complete answer to every problem
connected with extradition. It remains to be seen in actual practice
how the United States and the United Kingdom will apply the provisions of article 1 subject to the safeguard contained in article 3.
States still retain discretion and freedom of action through differing interpretation. 171
168. See REPORT or THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 10, 99th Cong.,
39th Sess. (1986).
169. S. EXEC. REP., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1986). Supplementary Extradition Treaty
with the United Kingdom, July 8, 1986. The following categories of offenses are excluded
from the political offense exceptions:
(a) an offense for which both Parties have the obligation to extradite under a multilateral convention;
(b) murder, voluntary, manslaughter, and assault causing bodily harm;
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking a hostage;
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or parcel
bomb, or any incendiary device if this use endangers any person; and
(e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offense.
Id.
170. Id. at art. 3(a) of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United
Kingdom.
171. For recent developments in multilateral treaties, see Problems of Extradition,
supra note 141, at 211-283. As stated by Rapporteur Karl Doehring: "New problems of the
international legal system of extradition with special reference to multilateral treaties," pro-
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The language of the recent General Assembly Resolution
61(XL) on measures to prevent international terrorism is more emphatic. Paragraph 8 runs as follows:
The General Assembly
8. also urges all States to cooperate with one another more closely,
especially through the exchange of relevant information concerning
the prevention and combatting of terrorism, the apprehension and
prosecution or extradition of the perpetrators of such acts, the conclusion of special treaties and/or the incorporation into appropriate
bilateral treaties of special clauses, in particular regarding the extradition or prosecution of terrorists. 172

VI.

CONCLUSION

The preceding study appears to suggest that the problem of
establishing jurisdiction over terrorist activities is but part and
parcel of the bigger problem of combatting international terrorism.
It is nevertheless a key to unlocking other problems. As always,
international cooperation provides a hopeful means in our search
for a meaningful response to terrorism and the problem of
jurisdiction.
One practical measure of international cooperation is to adopt
legislation creating jurisdiction to adjudicate by making terrorist
acts, as defined in the Introduction, justiciable and punishable,
thereby avoiding a vacuum in the substantive law, recognizing the
criminality and punishability of acts of international terrorism,
and bridging whatever gap or loophole that may exist in the jurisdiction of the forum State.
All the legitimate bases of jurisdiction may be adopted, including the passive personality principle which need ,n ot be completely dissociated from the protective principle. A State has the
right and also, in some instances, the duty to protect its own nationals abroad. One means of securing protection is to make it a
punishable offense for anyone to commit an act against a national
of the State calculated to create fear or terror within the State. An
act of international terrorism against an American citizen because
of the nationality may be deemed to be directed against the securposing definition of political offense in a negative sense. Id.
172. See G.A. Res. 61 (XL), supra note 136. The resolution also endorses l.C.A.0. and
International Maritime Organization (l.M.0.) recommendations for ratification of conventions dealing with terrorism aboard aircraft or against ships. Id.
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ity interest or stability of the United States. Once jurisdiction is
created for an offense against a national abroad whatever the true
basis, the forum State may assume and exercise jurisdiction, not
only to prosecute the alleged offender if and when found within
the territory, but also to secure his custody through the process of
extradition.
A more effective control of international terrorism may be
achieved through closer cooperation among States by ratifying international agreements dealing with terrorism, thereby applying a
common definition and standard for identification of acts of international terrorism, and facilitating exchange of relevant information concerning the prevention, suppression and punishment of
acts of terrorism as well as the arrest, prosecution or extradition of
the authors of such acts which should not be deemed to be political
offenses so as not to preclude the possibility of extradition. 173
The current problem is also closely linked to the possibility of
apportionment of criminal jurisdiction in the event of a jurisdictional conflict. Priorities may be set through bilateral or multilateral treaties, while the possibility of extradition provides room for
further flexibility of adjustment. Further developments of State
practice in this direction are about to assume a new dimension as
States, as members of the world organization, are moving closer in
their collective efforts to combat international terrorism. The
problem of jurisdiction patiently awaits its turn for a more orderly
settlement.
International law cannot afford to allow terrorism to go unchecked. Legal developments by way of codification must keep
pace with transnational terrorism which continues to increasingly
threaten the peace and security of mankind.

173. See the Fifth Report by Minister Doudou Thiam on the Draft Code of Offences
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Mar. 17, 1987. The new text of Art. 4 (1) of the
Draft Code provides that "every State has the duty to try or prosecute (aut dedere aut
punire), any perpetrator of an offence against the peace and security of mankind arrested in
its territory." Id. at 7-8. It was noted that decisions rendered at municipal levels were contradictory, and even a supreme jurisdiction to harmonize judicial decisions could itself adopt
decisions that would have to vary with the progress of time. Difficulty to secure extradition
is inherent in all cases where offenses are politically motivated. In reality, States might prefer to try the offenders and give them light sentences or acquit them altogether. Id
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